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Abstract This paper evaluates the Pugh Controlled
Convergence method and its relationship to recent devel-
opments in design theory. Computer executable models are
proposed simulating a team of people involved in iterated
cycles of evaluation, ideation, and investigation. The
models suggest that: (1) convergence of the set of design
concepts is facilitated by the selection of a strong datum
concept; (2) iterated use of an evaluation matrix can
facilitate convergence of expert opinion, especially if used
to plan investigations conducted between matrix runs; and
(3) ideation stimulated by the Pugh matrices can provide
large benefits both by improving the set of alternatives and
by facilitating convergence. As a basis of comparison,
alternatives to Pugh’s methods were assessed such as using
a single summary criterion or using a Borda count. These
models suggest that Pugh’s method, under a substantial
range of assumptions, results in better design outcomes
than those from these alternative procedures.
Keywords Concept selection 
Multi-criteria decision-making  Decision analysis 
Comparative judgment
1 Motivation
Recent research papers in engineering design have pro-
posed that there are some major deficiencies in core
elements of engineering practice. In particular, engineering
decision-making has been singled out for attention. The
following quotes give a sense of the concerns being raised:
• ‘‘Multi-criteria decision problems are still left largely
unaddressed in engineering design’’ (Franssen 2005).
• ‘‘A standard way to make decisions is to use pairwise
comparisons…. Pairwise comparisons can generate
misleading conclusions by introducing significant
errors into the decision process… rather than rare,
these problems arise with an alarmingly high likeli-
hood’’ (Saari and Sieberg 2004).
• ‘‘…there exists one and only one valid measure of
performance for an engineering design, that being von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility… we can say that all
other measures are wrong. This includes virtually all
measures and selection methods in common use’’
(Hazelrigg 1999).
This paper seeks to challenge the idea that current
engineering decision-making approaches are significantly
flawed. If decision making is at the core of engineering and
if we don’t have or don’t routinely use good decision
making capabilities, then a poor track record of the
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engineering profession should be observed. Yet over the
past century, engineering has successfully transformed
transportation, housing, communication, sanitation, food
supply, health care, and almost every other aspect of
human life (Constable and Somerville 2003). Studies sug-
gest that technical innovation accounts for more than 80%
of long term economic improvement (Solow 1957). How
can the methods of engineering design practice be so poor
and the progress resulting from engineering practice be so
valuable? A principal motivation of this paper is to explore
this dissonance. The paper addresses the issues more spe-
cifically by analyzing a specific design method, Pugh
Controlled Convergence and its relationship to recent
developments in design theory. Figure 1 illustrates how
Pugh Controlled Convergence has been subject to critique
either explicitly or implicitly by three recent papers. In the
second layer of the diagram, we list some features of
Pugh’s method. Below that, we list papers that raise con-
cerns about those features of the method. In the bottom
layer, we list aspects of the model developed in this paper
that are responsive to each critique.
Figure 1 guides the structure of this paper. Section 2.1
fleshes out the second layer of the diagram. In it, we
describe Pugh’s method in detail. Section 2.2 provides
more supporting detail on the third layer of the diagram. In
it, we discuss the recent research relevant to Pugh Con-
trolled Convergence including the three papers mentioned
in Fig. 1 and several others. Section 3 is related to the
bottom layer of the diagram and constitutes the core of the
paper. In Sect. 3, we build and explore a model of the
design process. Using the framework described by Frey
and Dym (2006) we construct computer executable entities
meant to represent, in abstract form, the aspects we con-
sider most essential to understand Pugh Controlled
Convergence. Our model explicitly includes: (1) the role of
the datum concept, (2) the convergence of expert opinion
based on investigation, and (3) the generation of new
alternatives. These considerations have not played a
prominent role in the scholarly debate on design decision
making, but it seems to us that they have a first order
impact in practice. In light of these considerations, we seek
to ascertain whether or not the reported undesirable
behaviors of Pugh’s method actually arise under realistic
conditions. Section 5 comprises a discussion of these
results.
2 Background
2.1 Review of Pugh Controlled Convergence
Pugh (1981, 1990) advocated that product development
teams should, at an early stage in the design process (after
developing specifications but before detailed design),
engage in an iterative process of culling down and adding
to the set of concepts under consideration. The goals of this
activity are: (1) a ‘controlled convergence’ on a strong
concept that has promise of out-competing the current
market leader; and (2) a shared understanding of the rea-
sons for the choice. We will refer to the overall process of
attaining these goals as Pugh Controlled Convergence or
PuCC.
A prominent aspect of PuCC is presentation and dis-
cussion of information in the form of a matrix. The
columns of the Pugh matrix are labeled with a description,
in drawings and text, of design concepts. The rows of the
matrix are labeled with concise statements of the criteria by
which the design concepts can be judged. The method
requires selection of a datum, preferably a design concept
that is both well understood and known to be generally
Fig. 1 Features of Pugh’s
method, critiques related to each
feature, and our model-based
approach to testing those claims
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strong. Often the initial datum concept is currently the
leader in the market. Evaluations are developed and
entered into the matrix through a facilitated discussion
among the experts. Each cell in the matrix contains sym-
bols1,2, or S indicating that the design concept related to
that column is clearly better than, clearly worse than, or
roughly the same as the datum concept as judged according
to the criterion of that row.
Academic publications on Pugh’s method will often
present neatly formatted tables representing a Pugh matrix.
This may contribute to a misunderstanding of what is
actually done. In practice, Pugh matrices are messy col-
lages of drawings and notes. This is a reflection of the
nature of early-stage design. The PuCC process is simple
and coarse-grained. Observation of teams show the method
is also flexible and heuristic. We assert that these are
affirmative benefits, making the method fit well into its
context. For example, alternatives to Pugh’s method often
require greater resolution of the scale (suggesting five or
ten levels rather than just three) and often require numer-
ical weighting factors. Pugh found by experience that this
sort of precision is not well suited to concept design. In this
paper, a model-based analysis is used to evaluate this
hypothesis regarding the benefits of simplicity in the
decision process and effectiveness in attaining good design
outcomes.
It is important to note that there is no voting in Pugh’s
method. Let us consider a situation in which several
experts claim that a concept is better than the datum and
others disagree. In Pugh’s method, a discussion proceeds in
which the experts on both sides communicate their reasons
for holding their views. In many cases, this resolves the
issue because either: (1) facts are brought to light that some
individual experts did not previously know, (2) a clarifi-
cation is made about what a design concept actually entails,
or (3) a clarification is made about what the criterion
actually means. If that discussion leads to an agreement
among the experts, then a 1 or 2 may be entered in the
matrix. If the disagreement persists for any significant
length of time, then an S is entered in the cell of the
evaluation matrix. In Pugh’s method, S can denote two
different situations. It can mean that the experts agree that
the concept’s merit is similar to the datum or that the
differences between the concept and the datum are con-
troversial and cannot be determined yet. In this case, team
members would be encouraged to find additional infor-
mation necessary to resolve the difference of opinion. Pahl
and Beitz (1984) have suggested an ‘‘i’’ or ‘‘?’’ should be
entered to more strongly encourage investigation).
Generally, the evaluation matrix includes summary
scores along the bottom. The number of 1, 2, or S scores
for each concept are counted and presented as a rough
measure of the characteristics of each alternative. This
raises an important issue. These scores are sometimes
interpreted as a means by which to choose the single
winning design. This misconception is reflected in termi-
nology—Pugh’s method is most often referred to in the
design literature as ‘‘Pugh Concept Selection’’ whereas
Pugh emphasized ‘‘Controlled Convergence’’. The term
‘‘Concept Selection’’ would seem to imply that after run-
ning a matrix a single alternative will be chosen. This is not
an accurate characterization of the PuCC process. The first
run of the evaluation matrix can help reduce the number of
design concepts under consideration, but is not meant to
choose a single alternative. A matrix run can result in at
least four kinds of decisions (not mutually exclusive)
including decisions to: (1) eliminate certain weak concepts
from consideration, (2) invest in further development of
some concepts, (3) invest in information gathering, and (4)
develop additional concepts based on what has been
revealed through the matrix and the discussions it cata-
lyzed. To follow up on these actions, the matrix should be
run iteratively as part of a convergence process.
To illustrate how iterated runs of the evaluation matrix
result in convergence, consider a real-world example. Khan
and Smith (1989) describe a case in which a team designed
a dynamically tuned gyroscope. The process began with 15
design concepts and 18 criteria, which we would charac-
terize as a typical problem scale. Figure 2 depicts results
from a sequence of three runs of a Pugh matrix each with a
different datum concept. The figure is organized with the
evaluations for all three runs of the matrix for each concept
in one column with the first run on the left, the second run
in the center, and the last run on the right. In the first matrix
run, concepts 5 and 13 were dominated by the datum and
concepts 2 and 11 were dominated by concept 12. There-
fore, the set of alternatives could have been reduced by
about one quarter in the first round although it appears that
all these alternatives were retained for one more round of
evaluation. Between the first and second matrix runs, a new
alternative labeled 12a was created to improve concept 12
along one of the dimensions in which it was judged to be
weak. After the second Pugh matrix was made, the team
could have eliminated five more alternatives that were
dominated, bringing the total of dominated designs up to
nine. Figure 3 reveals that the team took advantage of the
opportunity to save time and chose not to evaluate seven of
the nine dominated alternatives in the third Pugh matrix. In
addition, the team chose to focus on only half of the cri-
teria. Some criteria were dropped because they did not
discriminate among the alternatives and some because they
were too difficult to evaluate precisely. The third matrix
run did not enable any additional concepts to be identified
as dominated, but did result in a final choice of concept 12a
to be developed in detail. It is notable that concept 12a did
not have as many positives as concept 8, but perhaps it
Res Eng Design (2009) 20:41–58 43
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could be viewed as more balanced since it had no negatives
in the final round. Note also that, as is common in PuCC,
the concept finally chosen was not even present in the
initial set of concepts considered but rather emerged
through the continued creative process running in parallel
and informed by the evaluation process. This sort of par-
allel, mutually beneficial process of evaluation and ideation
was encouraged by Dym et al. (2002) and Ullman (2002) as
well as by Pugh (1990).
As the case study by Khan and Smith (1989) shows, the
PuCC process includes decision making, but it cannot be
sufficiently modeled only as decision making. The process
also involves learning and creative synthesis and there is no
clear line when these activities stop and decision making
begins. Learning, synthesis, and decision-making proceed
in parallel and synergistically. The analysis and discussion
of design concepts catalyzes creation of additional con-
cepts, which in turn may simplify decision-making. This
interplay among decision-making and creative work is
often neglected when considering the merits of decision-
making methods. Our models in Sect. 3 and 4 explicitly
include these aspects of the design process.
The Pugh method is among the best known engineering
design methodologies, but it seems to be used by only a
modest proportion of practicing engineers. A survey of 106
experienced engineers (most of whom were working in the
United States) indicated that just over 15% had used Pugh
Concept Selection in their work and that most of those
found it useful (about 13% of the 15%) (Yang 2007). Other
design methods included in the survey were FMEA, QFD,
robust design, and design structure matrices which were
used at work by 43, 20, 19, and 12% of respondents
respectively. The survey found that a few simple techniques
were used by a majority of practicing engineers including
need-finding, benchmarking, storyboarding, and brain-
storming. Another survey specifically focused on selection
Fig. 2 Data from three runs of Pugh matrices in the design of a gyroscope [from Khan and Smith (1989)]
Fig. 3 A framework for decision-based engineering design (from
Hazelrigg 1998)
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methods (in this case, a survey of Finnish industry). This
survey suggested Pugh’s method is used by roughly 2% of
firms (Salonen and Perttula 2005). Informal approaches
labeled as ‘‘concept review meetings’’, ‘‘intuitive selection’’
or ‘‘expert assessment’’ were estimated to be used in about
40% of companies. These two surveys, although not con-
clusive, suggest that only the simplest and most flexible
design techniques are used widely and that more formal
design methods are generally used much less. We wish to
present a case for an appropriate degree of structure. We
think there is somewhat too little structure in engineering
practice today and probably far too much structure is rec-
ommended in most of the design methodology literature.
Later sections of this paper are intended to make this
argument by comparing PuCC, a relatively simple method,
with more complex alternatives. First we review some lit-
erature that presents technical objections to Pugh’s method.
2.2 Pugh, utility, and Arrow’s theorem
Hazelrigg (1998) has proposed a framework for decision-
based design (DBD) as graphically depicted in Fig. 3. A
central feature of the framework is that the choice among
alternative designs is impacted by the decision maker’s
values, uncertainties, and economic factors such as demand
at a chosen price. Hazelrigg’s DBD framework requires
rolling up all these diverse considerations into a single scalar
value—utility as defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953). Having computed this value for each alternative
configuration, the choice among the design alternatives is
simple—‘‘the preferred choice is the alternative (or lottery)
that has the highest expected utility’’ [Hazelrigg 1999].
Hazelrigg’s framework for DBD is subject to much
debate and continues to have significant influence in the
community of researchers in engineering design. The
textbook Decision Making in Engineering Design (Lewis
et al. 2006) reflects a wide array of opinions on how
decision theory can be implemented in engineering design
and also demonstrates that the core ideas of the DBD
framework are being developed actively.
Hazelrigg’s framework explicitly excludes the use of
Pugh’s method of Controlled Convergence. Hazelrigg
states the conclusion in broad terms explaining that the
acceptance of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axioms
leads to one and only one valid measure of worth for design
options. Since Pugh’s method does not explicitly involve
computation of utility, Hazelrigg has argued that Pugh’s
method is invalid. Also, DBD invokes Arrow’s General
Possibility Theorem (Arrow 1951). Hazelrigg (1999) states
‘‘in a case with more than two decision makers or in a
multi-attribute selection with more than two attributes,
seeking a choice between more than two alternatives,
essentially all decision-making methods are flawed’’.
Scott and Antonsson (1999) argue that the implications
of Arrow’s theorem in engineering design are not nearly so
severe. A principal basis for this conclusion is that ‘‘the
foundation of many engineering decision methods is the
explicit comparison of degrees of preference’’. This line of
approach to the possibility of choice is similar to Sen’s who
states ‘‘Do Arrow’s impossibility, and related results, go
away with the use of interpersonal comparisons…? The
answer briefly is yes’’ [Sen 1998]. In combining the
influence of multiple attributes, Scott and Antonsson state
that ‘‘there is always a well-defined aggregated order
among alternatives, which is available to anyone with the
time and resources to query a decision maker about all
possible combinations’’. The DBD framework establishes
the aggregated order via expected utility, but Scott and
Antonsson concluded that ‘‘the relative complexity of these
methods is not justified’’ compared to simpler procedures
such as using a weighted arithmetic mean. Pugh’s method
represents a further simplification and this paper seeks to
determine whether this additional reduction in complexity
is also justified.
Franssen (2005) attempted to counter the arguments by
Scott and Antonnsen. Franssen challenges, on measure
theoretic grounds, the existence of a global preference
order that is determined by any aggregation of individual
criterion preference values. Franssen argues that if criterion
values are ordinal or interval, then the global aggregated
order posited by Scott and Antonsson cannot be defined or
else that it will be subject to Arrow’s result. More funda-
mental however, is Franssen’s assumption that measurable
attributes of the design can never determine the designer’s
overall preference ordering. Franssen holds that ‘‘it is of
paramount importance to realize that preference is a mental
concept and is neither logically nor causally determined by
the physical characteristics of a design option’’. Franssen
concluded that ‘‘Arrow’s theorem applies fully to multi-
criteria decision problems as they occur in engineering
design’’. Franssen also draws specific conclusions regard-
ing Pugh’s method:
…This method… can attach different global prefer-
ences, depending on what is taken as the datum….
Hence it does not meet Arrow’s requirement…. It is
important not to be mistaken about what Arrow’s
theorem tells us with respect to the problem…. What
it says is that, for any procedure of a functional form
that is used to arrive at a collective or global order,
there are specific cases in which it will fail….
Accordingly, for any specific procedure applied, one
must always be sensitive to the possibility of such
failures.
This quote by Frannsen is a major motivation for this
paper. Our model-based assessment of Pugh’s method of
Res Eng Design (2009) 20:41–58 45
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controlled convergence will explicitly deal with the issue
that the selection of the datum does make a difference in
running the matrix. And, as Franssen notes, one must
always be sensitive to the possibility of failures induced by
one’s chosen design methods. But the possibility of failure
is not enough to justify abandoning a technique that has
been useful in the past. This paper seeks to quantify the
impacts of such failures and weigh them against the ben-
efits of the PuCC process.
2.3 Pugh and pairwise comparison
Saari and Sieberg (2004) constructed an argument against all
uses of pairwise comparisons in engineering design except
for very restricted classes of procedures including the Borda
count. Going beyond the argument based on Arrow’s theo-
rem which only claims the possibility of error, Saari and
Sieberg make specific claims about the likelihood and
severity of the errors. Saari and Sieberg propose a theorem
including the statement that ‘‘it is with probability zero that a
data set is free from the distorting influence of the Condorcet
n-tuple data’’. From this mathematical statement they draw
the practical conclusion that pairwise comparisons ‘‘can
generate misleading conclusions by introducing significant
errors into the decision process … rather than rare, these
problems arise with an alarmingly high likelihood’’.
Saari and Sieberg claim that ‘‘even unanimity data is
adversely influenced by components in the Condorcet
cyclic direction’’. In Pugh’s method, designs that are
unanimously judged to be superior across all criteria will
never be eliminated. Therefore the distorting effect is not
always reflected in the alternative chosen, but in some
other regard. Saari and Sieberg state ‘‘suppose the A 
B  C ranking holds over all criteria…. If we just rely on
the pairwise outcomes, this tally suggests that the A 
B and A  C rankings have the same intensity…. It is this
useful intensity information that pairwise comparisons
lose…’’. This raises an important point related to intensity
of feelings. It is not enough that an engineering method
should lead to selection of a good concept. It is also
essential that the method should give the team members an
appropriate degree of confidence in their choice. But Saari
and Sieberg’s proposed mathematical processing of the
team members’ subjective opinions may not have the
desired result. We suggest that a psychological commit-
ment to the decision may be attained more effectively by
convergence of opinion rather than balancing opinions as if
design were an election. As differences of opinion are
revealed by the Pugh process, investigation and discussion
ensue. Since we consider this an important part of engi-
neering design, we seek to incorporate in our model the
possibility that people can discover objective facts and
change their minds.
A second theme in Saari and Sieberg’s paper regards
separation of concerns. Pugh’s method explicitly asks
decision makers to consider multiple criteria by which the
options might be judged. Saari and Sieberg claim that such
separation of the information leads to a ‘‘realistic danger’’
that the ‘‘majority of the criteria need not embrace the
combined outcomes’’. Saari and Sieberg’s argument for
this conclusion is ‘‘Engineering decisions often are linked
in the sense that the {A, B} outcome is to be combined with
the {C, D} conclusion. For instance, a customer survey
may have {A, B} as the two alternatives for a car’s body
style while {C, D} are alternative choices for engine per-
formance’’. Saari and Sieberg then outline an imaginary
scenario in which the survey data lead to a preference
reversal due to an interaction among criteria. The survey
data in the scenario suggest that although customers prefer
body style A when considered separately and engine per-
formance C when considered separately, they do not prefer
the combination of those particular body styles and engine
performance options. Saari and Sieberg conclude the
resulting product ‘‘runs the risk of commercial failure’’ and
that ‘‘product design decisions… could be inferior or even
disastrous’’.
With the argument regarding separation of concerns,
Saari and Sieberg may have sacrificed his claim that these
events occur with high likelihood. Many inter-criterion
interactions in engineering are known a priori to be too
small to cause the reversals Saari and Sieberg describe.
Consider a specific example in which a team designed a
gyroscope and needed to consider criteria such as
‘‘machinability of parts’’ and ‘‘axial stiffness’’ (Khan and
Smith 1989). The sort event that Saari and Sieberg ask us
to consider is that a design concept A is better than concept
B on ‘‘machinability of parts’’ and A is also better than B on
‘‘axial stiffness’’, but that the ways those two criteria
combine makes B better than A overall. This sort of event
seems unlikely to us. Why would hard-to-machine parts
become preferable to easy-to-machine parts when the
gyroscope happens to be more stiff? This example illus-
trates that in many pairings of technical criteria, it is safe to
assume separability of concerns. A more challenging
example is Saari and Sieberg’s ‘‘body style’’ and ‘‘engine
performance’’ pair. Clearly, a sporty body style is a better
match to a more powerful engine, even if this implies more
noise and lower fuel efficiency. But there is a large prac-
tical difference between interaction of components and
interaction of criteria. We do not think lower fuel effi-
ciency is actually preferred to high fuel efficiency in the
presence of a sporty body style, but perhaps a louder engine
sound actually is preferred. It seems to us that interactions
among criteria are not large except for pairs of aesthetic
criteria and that preference reversals are rare. Given the
possible problems sketched here, we will evaluate (in
46 Res Eng Design (2009) 20:41–58
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Sect. 4.1) how large inter-criterion interactions would have
to be to lead to choice of weak concepts.
The analysis by Saari and Sieberg is not only a warning
regarding potential risks, but is also presented as a guide to
modifying the design process—‘‘Once it is understood
what kind of information is lost, alternative decision
approaches can be designed’’. Unfortunately, the proposed
remedies impose significant demands on information
gathering and/or processing. Saari and Sieberg suggest a
procedure involving ‘‘adding the scores each alternative
gets over all pairwise comparisons’’. Let us consider what
this implies for the Pugh process using the specific example
in Khan and Smith (1989). The process began with 15
design concepts and 18 criteria. The first run of the matrix
therefore demanded that 14 concepts be compared with the
datum across 18 criteria so that 252 pairwise comparisons
had to be made by the team to fill out the first evaluation
matrix. If the run of the matrix was to be completed in a
standard 8-h work day, then about 2 min on average could
be spent by the team deliberating on what symbol should
be assigned to each cell in the matrix. In reality, many of
the cells might be decided upon very quickly because the
difference between the concept and the datum is obvious to
all concerned. However, even accounting for this, the time
pressures are quite severe. Saari and Sieberg’s remedy
requires that every possible pairwise comparison must be
made requiring 15 choose 2 pairwise combinations of
concepts across 18 criteria—1890 pairwise comparisons in
all. If the process is to be completed in a single work day,
there would be only 15 s on average per comparison.
Alternately, one might preserve the same average discus-
sion time per cell (2 min) and allow around 63 working
hours for the task rather than 8. Given this order-of-mag-
nitude expansion of resource requirements, it is possible
Saari and Sieberg’s suggested remedy is more harmful than
the Condorcet cycles themselves. Dym et al. (2002) prove
that pairwise comparison charts provide results identical to
those of the Borda count, however this approach is also
time consuming. We suggest it’s worth considering simpler
procedures and so we make a comparative analysis of
Pugh’s method with the Borda count in Sect. 4.3.
2.4 Pugh and rating, weighting, and sensitivity
Takai and Ishii (2004) presented an analysis of Pugh’s
method including comparison with alternative approaches.
The paper posits three desiderata of concept evaluation
methods: (1) The capability to select the most preferred
concept, (2) The capability to indicate how well the most
preferred concept will eventually satisfy the target
requirements, and (3) The capability to perform sensitivity
analysis of the most preferred concept to further concept
improvement efforts.
To evaluate the Pugh method, Takai and Ishii suggest
three possible modifications of Pugh’s matrix. Two of the
modifications involve types of rating and weighting. One of
the modifications involves computing the probability of
satisfying targets. In a case study involving design of an
injector for a new linear collider, they consider the merits
of three alternatives over nine criteria. All four methods
suggested the same design as the most preferred alterna-
tive. However, a further analysis suggested that even the
most preferred concept had only an 8.9% chance of satis-
fying its requirements and that if availability were
improved by 3% and cost reduced by 30%, then the
chances of success improved to 76.8%. They conclude that
the most promising approach was to quantify one’s beliefs
in terms of distributions, evaluate concepts by probability
of satisfying targets, and perform sensitivity analysis.
The analysis by Takai and Ishii seems appropriate to
situations in which the number of alternatives is small,
all the alternatives are well characterized, and the pos-
sibility of generating new concepts is not available. Such
a scenario is likely to arise at some stage in the con-
vergence process, but perhaps such modifications are
counterproductive in the earlier stages. If probabilistic
analyses were conducted with rather coarse estimates,
there may be a risk of misleading the team into false
confidence. Pugh and Smith (1976) argue that numbers
used in evaluation matrices are easily interpreted as
similar in standing to the sorts of objective number
engineers most often work with (e.g., densities, voltages,
and elastic moduli). Overly precise representations create
a risk of unwarranted faith in decisions based on rough
estimates. It is possible that, in the early stages of design,
the same time and resources needed for probabilistic
analysis might be used in some more productive way.
The model we propose in Sect. 3 is intended to enable
exploration of such trade-offs among different emphases
and different styles of work.
2.5 The psychology of pairwise comparison
To address the various critiques and the proposed
improvements of PuCC, it is worthwhile to review some
results from psychological research. The discipline of
psychology can provide insight into what is and is not
possible for humans to do or to understand. Psychology
also provides information about human capacities that can
be leveraged by decision making methods. This section
reviews selected topics helpful to understanding later parts
of this paper.
Decision field theory (DFT) is an approach to modeling
human decision making. The theory acknowledges that
humans make decisions by a process of deliberation
which is inherently dynamic with degrees of preference
Res Eng Design (2009) 20:41–58 47
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varying over time (Johnson and Busemeyer 2005). DFT
models can be created that simultaneously accord with a
large set of empirically demonstrated effects and have
been used to analyze a variety of decision tasks including,
most relevant to engineering, multi-attribute decision
making under time constraints (Diederich 1997). The
models described in Sect. 3 bear some resemblance to
those from Decision Field Theory since they are dynamic
with states varying through repeated cycles based on
previous states. A difference of our approach from DFT is
that we do not model decision making as emerging from
weighting of valences primarily, but instead model deci-
sion making as determined by decision rules or heuristics.
Psychology research has shown that such heuristics are
often more robust than schemes involving weighting,
especially in generalizing from experience to new tasks
(Czerlinski et al. 1999).
Experimental evidence bears out the idea from Decision
Field Theory that decision making emerges from adaptive
sampling. Shimojo et al. (2003) showed that when pre-
sented with two faces and asked to choose the preferred
one that subjects alternate between gazing at each face and
begin directing more attention to the preferred one until a
threshold is reached at which point a decision is made.
Studies also showed that sampling and decision interact
early in the process, long before actual conscious choice
(Simion and Shimojo 2006) and that manipulation of
sampling can influence choice (Shimojo et al. 2003). This
result is in good affinity with the somatic marker
hypothesis including the proposition that evaluations of
complex scenarios are not explicitly represented in mem-
ory but instead correlated to bioregulatory processes
(Bechara and Damasio 2000). This hypothesis poses a
challenge for those who suggest decision making can
always be made better through mathematical procedures
since some of the information needed may not be acces-
sible to conscious processes. This perspective from
cognitive science links back to engineering design when
we consider the process of rating alternatives. Saaty
(2006) explains that ‘‘comparisons must precede ratings
because ideals can only be created through experience’’
and because ‘‘comparisons are our biological inheritance’’.
Procedures such as the Analytical Hierarchy Process are
meant to take the raw data of pairwise comparison and to
create interval scale measurements. In the process,
inconsistencies or rank disagreements may be discovered
(Buede and Maxwell 1995) and procedures have been
suggested for correcting those (Limayem and Yannou
2007). Even if such inconsistencies are not present, there
is still substantial uncertainty in rankings due to uncer-
tainties in the pairwise comparisons and there exist
methods for quantifying these uncertainties (Scott 2007).
This paper considers the possibility that a simpler set of
pairwise comparisons such as in PuCC might result in a
better outcome despite uncertainties in input data and the
presence of undetected inconsistencies.
Research on human perception and judgment may
prove useful in evaluating results in later sections. Psy-
chologists draw a distinction between discrimination and
magnitude estimation. In a discrimination task, a human
subject is asked to compare two entities and decide which
has a property to a greater degree. In a magnitude
estimation task, a human subject is asked to give a
quantitative value for an entity along a continuous scale.
Smith et al. (1984) conducted a study in which human
subjects were asked to make judgments about line length
under various task conditions. The study showed that
human judgment is much less prone to failure (by roughly
a factor of two) when two entities are compared directly
rather than estimating values on a continuous scale.
Katsikopoulos and Martignon (2006) studied paired
comparisons for more complex criteria so that multiple
cues are needed and they prove that psychologically
plausible heuristics can, under some conditions, provide
the same results as the optimal Bayesian computation. We
suggest that these studies demonstrate an affirmative value
of paired comparison and discrimination tasks. By
avoiding rating and weighting, Pugh method enables
engineers to consider the relative merits of alternatives in
ways that are simple enough to do without external aids
and also demonstrably accurate. These simplifications
should make the judgments of engineers less prone to
error. The implications of this hypothesis will be explored
in Sect. 4.
3 A model of Pugh controlled convergence
This section presents a quantitative model of the Pugh
Controlled Convergence process. The model is a highly
abstract representation of the process we have observed
among real teams using the method. It is important to keep
in mind that ‘‘essentially, all models are wrong, but some
are useful’’ (Box and Draper 1987). Although this model
cannot hope to capture, in all its facets, how concept design
actually proceeds, we envision that people can use the
model to probe their beliefs about decision-making and its
role in engineering design.
3.1 A model of the first round of the evaluation matrix
This section describes a basic model of the first round of an
evaluation matrix. The model is stochastic, so the model is
executed in many independent trials so that we can char-
acterize the behavior statistically. In each trial, the
simulation is comprised of the following four steps:
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3.1.1 Create a set of design concepts to be evaluated
In the model, there are values Cij where i [ 1…n and
j [ 1…m. Each value Cij represents the objective merit of
concept j on criterion i. These objective merits will influ-
ence the Pugh matrix, but the two matrices are not
equivalent since Cij is a real number and the corresponding
Pugh matrix element has only three levels,1, S, and2. The
values Cij are sampled from random variables with distri-
butions Cij * N(s, 1) and Ci * N(0, 1), j = 1. Care is
required in interpreting the use of random variables here.
Random variables enable us to generate a diverse set of
concepts, but the values of Cij are fixed within each trial.
The datum concept in the first run has index, j = 1. The
intrinsic merits of the datum concept are selected from a
different population than those of all the other concepts. The
factor, s, represents the relative strength of the datum con-
cept. In our model, larger values are preferred and therefore,
if s [ 0, the datum is better than the rest of the concepts on
average across the many trials although it can be weak along
some criteria in any particular trial. To illustrate the
meaning of this parameter, consider that a value s = 1.0
implies the datum concept has a criterion score drawn from
a population one standard deviation above the mean of
criterion ratings for new concepts generated. Therefore, at a
parameter setting s = 1.0 each new concept will improve
upon the datum in about one in four opportunities.
3.1.2 Model a set of opinions held by a group of experts
In the model, there are values CEijk where k [ 1…o rep-
resent the estimated merit of design concept j on criterion i
as judged by expert k. We model the expert opinion as
correlated with the intrinsic merits of the design concepts,
but differing from expert to expert. This is accomplished
by computing the values as CEijk = Cij(1 ? eij) with
eijk Nð0; r2ijÞ. Again, these values are related to the Pugh
matrix, but not equivalent to it. In particular, there are o
different expert opinions of each concept’s merits along
each criterion, yet only one symbol will be entered in the
Pugh matrix.
3.1.3 Generate the Pugh matrix
Each cell of the Pugh matrix, Mij, corresponds to a design
concept j and a criterion i. The cells are determined as
Mij = 1if CEijk [ CEijk for all k [ 1…o, Mij = 2if
CEijk \ CEijk for all k [ 1…o, Mij = S otherwise. To state
the same thing another way, if all experts agree that the
concept is better than the datum, then a 1 is entered in that
cell. If all experts agree that the concept is worse than the
datum, then a 2 is entered. If there is any disagreement
among the experts, then an S is entered.
3.1.4 Eliminate concepts based on the Pugh matrix
In actual use of the Pugh Controlled Convergence process,
there is no formulaic prescription that automatically leads
to the elimination of a concept. In this model, we eliminate
any concept that is dominated. In other words, concept A is
dominated by another concept B if, according to M, B is
better along one or more criteria and is no worse than A
along all other criteria. In PuCC, dominated concepts
appear to have no advantages that could not be drawn as
well or more easily from some other concept and will
therefore be eliminated.
We simulate the process above to explore the influence
the ability of a design team to converge by eliminating
weaker concepts from consideration. In particular we
wished to understand how the strength of the datum con-
cept influences convergence. To anchor our analysis more
strongly in data, we used four case studies along with the
model—Khan and Smith (1989), Pugh (1990), Begley
(1990), and Miller et al. (2005). Each of these publications
presented a Pugh matrix from which we could infer how
much convergence was possible. In each case, we consid-
ered how many concepts were dominated according to the
matrix. Begley (1990) was a somewhat non-standard case
study since two different datum concepts were used in
forming the Pugh matrix. The case concerned steering
columns, some of which enabled tilting and some of which
did not. The team found it difficult to compare concepts
across these two groupings. This made convergence more
difficult in this case study. We did not attempt to correct for
this minor discrepancy.
In Fig. 4, the convergence data from the four case
studies are presented along with corresponding model-
based results. Figure 4 presents results from a single
application of a Pugh matrix—convergence resulting from
repeated applications is addressed in Sect. 3.2. In our
Fig. 4 The ability of the first run of the evaluation matrix to
eliminate weak concepts
Res Eng Design (2009) 20:41–58 49
123
model, the strength of the datum was varied from zero to
three in seven equal increments (s = 0, 0.5, 1.0, … 3.0).
The number of initial concepts and the number of engi-
neering criteria evaluated were set at four discrete
combinations (15, 18), (13, 22), (12, 34), and (33, 22)
chosen to correspond with the case studies. Each value on
the curves plotted in Fig. 4 arises from 500 replications of
a model with seven experts each of whom had random
error in criterion judgments generated with a standard
deviation of 0.5. The assumption of seven experts was
based on roughly the number of disciplines reflected in the
list of criteria from the case studies. The degree of error
was set at 0.5 which made the number of S ratings in the
Pugh matrices a reasonable match with those observed in
the case studies. The convergence observed in each of the
four case studies is graphically depicted by placing a
symbol at the height corresponding to the number of initial
concepts and an arrow down to the number of concepts not
dominated according to the Pugh matrix. The symbols and
arrows were adjusted horizontally so that the arrow heads
lie upon the curve generated by the model with the number
of concepts and number of criteria matching those in the
case study. To emphasize the s values estimated in this
way, the symbols are repeated along the x axis of Fig. 4.
A principal conclusion we draw from Fig. 4 is that
datum strength (s values) above 1.0 are needed to explain
the degree of convergence observed in engineering prac-
tice. All four case studies attained a fairly good degree of
convergence, ranging from about 25% to about 70%.
According to our model, convergence of less than 10%
should be expected with datum strength at 1.0 or weaker.
With a parameter value of s = 1.0, the probability is far
below 0.1% of seeing four instances with convergence as
large as observed in the four case studies (40% average
across the sample). To make the statement somewhat more
formally, a null hypothesis of s \ 1.0 has a corresponding
p-value less than 0.1%. An alternative explanation of the
data is that there are actually two different populations
mixed together here, some projects that clearly have very
strong datum concepts and others that might have weak
datum concepts. For the two cases Khan and Smith (1989)
and Begley (1990), the range of simulation results are
reasonably consistent (p [ 10%) with the null hypothesis
that s = 0.
To further explore the conclusion above, we considered
the consequence if a strong datum exists but cannot be
identified by the team. We repeated the simulations with
the datum selected at random and found that the conver-
gence was reduced. The decrement in convergence was
modest over the range of s = 1.0–2.5 where the data sug-
gests the parameter values tend to be distributed.
To summarize, a major critique levied against the Pugh
method is that the choice of the datum influences the
outcome of the concept selection process. The analysis
presented in this section reveals several facts relevant to
this issue:
(1) In practice, the datum concept is significantly stronger
than the rest of the population. Since the datum is not
arbitrary in practice, it seems to us less problematic
that datum selection can influence the process (for
example, by slowing convergence).
(2) If there is a strong datum concept, the first round of
PuCC will reduce the set of alternatives by a
substantial degree, ranging from 25 to 70% in most
cases.
(3) If the datum were not strong in some particular case,
if Pugh’s approach is followed properly, the conse-
quence would not be a poor decision, it would be a
lack of convergence in the first round. The PuCC
process, as we modeled it here, will tend to retain
many concepts rather than risk eliminating anything
worthwhile.
(4) A single run of the Pugh matrix rarely leads to
selection of a single alternative. This is to be expected
as the matrix is part of an iterative process of learning
and creative synthesis. The next section develops a
model of the additional work required following the
first run of a Pugh matrix.
3.2 A model of work between matrix runs
We saw in the previous section that the first run of the Pugh
matrix eliminates only a modest number of concepts. In
practice, this may be a positive feature of the method
because each one of the remaining concepts exhibits
potential in some dimensions. In work between the runs of
the matrix, the design team may find ways to make use of
all the concepts that were carried forward. Some concepts
may be actively developed and others may serve as a
source of ideas. The process by which the design team
seeks improvements between matrix runs has been incor-
porated into our model and is described below.
When a large number of concepts are in play, some
additional decision making is needed to set priorities for
further work. This is a principal justification for summary
information that is constructed at the bottom of the Pugh
matrix. Concepts with a large number of 1 scores and rel-
atively few 2 scores represent good platforms on which to
build a serious contender against a strong datum. Concepts
with a small number of 1 scores and relatively many
2 scores represent sources of ideas, but probably do not
deserve further investment in their own right. The PuCC
process does not include any formula for making these
decisions. Nevertheless, we propose an algorithm so that we
can implement it in our model. The team works in two ways:
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Ideation—Between runs of the matrix, the team can
invest time and energy in ideation—creative work focused
by the information revealed in the previous matrix run.
This is an important aspect of the engineering work that
would normally be conducted between iterations of Pugh’s
evaluation matrices. Our model of this activity is based on
the possibility of forming hybrids of two concepts. Some-
times one can combine different aspects of two or more
concepts to form a new concept superior to any of its
constituents. We assume that between runs of the matrix,
one of the designs in the top 1/3 is selected at random as a
basis for a hybrid. Based on the matrix M from the last run,
a second design is selected that appears most comple-
mentary in the sense that it has strengths in just those areas
where the chosen concept requires improvements. The
hybrid is then formed assuming that, for each criterion i,
the new value Cij is the larger of those of two designs being
merged. This is an abstract, highly simplified representa-
tion of the creative process. In reality, complex technical
factors determine which combinations of concepts are
feasible and which are not. We want to express in our
model the possibility that such hybrids can emerge in
response to the evaluation process. We seek to represent
this in a reasonably realistic way so that a small number of
hybrids that address some, but not all of the observed
challenges we observe in experience. This model of idea-
tion, although rough, does enable study of the interplay
between creative work, evaluation, and decision making
which we believe is critical to drawing an accurate picture
of various concept design methods.
Investigation—Between runs of the matrix, the team can
seek improved understanding of the design problem.
Because resources are assumed to be constrained, we
model investigation of a focused nature guided by the last
Pugh matrix. Our model of this activity is that for each
concept j, if it was in the top 1/3 and it earned an S in the
previous Pugh matrix on criterion i, then for each expert k
the opinion CEijk is refined. In addition, all the concepts
receive a refined estimate in the three most influential
criteria. The refined estimates are modeled by reducing the
parameter rij by a factor of two and newly sampling the
expert opinion. This is meant to represent the possibility
that investigation (including computation, experimentation,
interaction with customers, and discussion among the
experts) can lead the team to a shared understanding of the
issues affecting the decision. In our model, investigation
moves the criterion estimates of each expert into better
alignment with the objective merits.
Figure 5 presents results from simulations conducted
with ideation and/or investigation included as described
above in repeated rounds of controlled convergence. The
horizontal axis corresponds to the phase of the work with
progression in time from left to right. We assumed that the
Pugh matrix would be run three times with two periods of
work between matrix runs. Each point in Fig. 4 arises from
1,000 replications of a model with 15 initial concepts, 7
experts, a moderately strong datum concept (s = 1.2), and
moderately large initial variance in expert opinion
(rij = 0.5). The vertical axis represents the number of
concepts under consideration. We ran two cases, one in
which a single hybrid concept was formed between matrix
runs, and a case with no new concepts generated. For the
case including ideation between matrix runs, we plot the
median and the 10th and 90th percentiles to give a sense of
the variance within the population of trials. For the other
case we plot only the median to avoid cluttering the Figure.
The convergence observed in a real world case study in
Khan and Smith (1989) is also presented for comparison.
A key observation from Fig. 5 is that the model with
hybrids being generated is generally consistent with the
trend in Khan and Smith (1989). After the modest con-
vergence in the first round, the degree of convergence is
primarily dependant on the creation of hybrids. If hybrids
are formed, subsequent work enables weaker concepts to
be eliminated at a high rate so that only a few options
remain after three runs of the matrix and after filtering out
poorly balanced designs. Both the model and the case study
are consistent with this conclusion. On the other hand, if
hybrids are not formed, then convergence based on domi-
nance will be very slow. Changing the datum does enable
one or two concepts to be eliminated even if hybrids were
not formed. Other approaches for trade study analysis
would be needed for selection in this case. Mistree et al.
(1994) presented a method for concept selection involving
multiple rounds of evaluation with different datum con-
cepts in each round. Their method involved weighting of
the criteria so that summary ‘‘merit functions’’ could be
formed. We think rating and weighting can be avoided if
hybrids can be formed and that Fig. 5 supports this
conclusion.
Fig. 5 The convergence of PuCC through three iterations with and
without new concepts being generated
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It is critical to appreciate the mechanism explaining
the connection between divergence and convergence.
A hybrid of two complementary designs can often
dominate a substantial number of competitors. Visualiz-
ing the patterns of strengths and weaknesses in the Pugh
matrix seems, based on our experience, to catalyze the
creative work needed to generate new concepts that can
simplify future decision making. We believe this was the
reason that, in Khan and Smith (1989), so many concepts
were eliminated in the second run of the Pugh matrix.
Our model of hybrid generation included two such
hybrid creation events, but still matches well the con-
vergence attained by actual practitioners who reported
only one hybrid being generated. Therefore, we suspect
that engineers are better at creating hybrids after run-
ning Pugh matrices than we have reflected in our
simulations.
Even if we acknowledge the ways that creative work
can create dominant concepts, convergence by dominance
alone may not suffice for convergence. According to our
simulations, if there are many criteria, around half of the
total concepts may remain even after three rounds of
Pugh matrix runs. However, considerable additional con-
vergence can be made once it is known that additional
hybrids will not be formed. As the datum strength
increases through PuCC, many designs tend to have one
or two positives overwhelmed by a large number of
negatives. Although not strictly dominated, poorly bal-
anced designs can be safely eliminated after the last
matrix run without sacrificing future opportunities for
creative work. Our model suggests that a simple rule
based on a 2:1 ratio of 2:1 will eliminate a large number
of the remaining concepts. At this point, either a few
designs should be developed in detail, or else recourse
might be made to rating and weighting or probabilistic
analysis [as in Takai and Ishii (2004)] to converge to a
single alternative.
4 Comparison of decision making approaches
The previous section shows that the Pugh Controlled
Convergence Process, under appropriate conditions, can
down-select to a small number of alternatives without
resorting to voting, rating, or weighting. But we also need
to explore the merits of such an approach compared to
alternative procedures. The next sub-section presents an
extension of the previous model to incorporate ‘‘bottom
line’’ measures of the design outcome. Subsequently that
model is used to evaluate methodological alternatives
inspired by the design literature such as papers by Hazel-
rigg (1998), Saari and Sieberg (2004), and Takai and Ishii
(2004).
4.1 A model of profitability
Let us suppose there is real scalar Pj which represents the
overall merits of the jth design concept. It is convenient to
think of the P vector as standing for profitability of the jth
design concept if it were selected and developed.
Central to our model is a quantitative relationship
between the criteria Cij and the value of Pi. We assume
that, all other things being equal, a higher rating along one
criterion should cause the overall merit to rise. However,
we also want to address the issue of ‘‘separation of con-
cerns’’ raised by Saari and Sieberg (2004). Our model
includes the possibility that scoring best across individual
criteria does not necessarily imply a design that scores best
overall. It is our judgment that this does not happen often in
practice, but we include it here to measure its possible
impact. To include this possibility and otherwise keep the
model as simple as possible, we include only two-factor











The sensitivity of the overall merit of any design
concept to the ith criterion score is represented by bi and
the interactions among criteria are represented by bpq. By
modeling the relationship between criteria and P in this
way, we are assuming that a full set of criteria uniquely
determine the expected outcomes of the design process. In
other words, we assume the expected profitability of two
designs should be the same for any two concepts that score
the same on all criteria.
To instantiate instances of the model in Eq. (1), we
select the coefficients b from the populations bi * |N(0, 1)|
and bpq * N(0, s
2). The coefficients with a single subscript
are non-negative so that the criterion values more naturally
correspond with the conventional symbols in the evaluation
matrix (e.g., a1 is meant to indicate a ‘‘better’’ value). The
parameter s represents the relative degree of interactions
between criteria. To express the notion that main effects
are usually larger than interactions, we suggest s  1 in a
reasonable model of concept design. Increasing values of s
lead to a situation in which criterion values individually
explain only a small fraction of the overall merit. Given the
distributions we have chosen, interactions between criteria
are equally likely to be synergistic or anti-synergistic.
At this point it is useful to discuss the concept of inter-
criterion interactions which are included in our model
through coefficients bpq. An improvement in a criterion
value such as ‘‘manufacturability’’ should lead to an
increase in a measure of overall merit such as expected
profit. An improvement in some other criterion, such as
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‘‘ease of use’’ should also lead to increase in a measure of
overall merit. However, there may be good reasons to
believe the effects of two improvements are not simply
additive. In extreme cases, anti-synergistic interactions
creates a risk of a ranking reversal which was emphasized
by Saari and Sieberg (2004). We do not consider such
inter-criteria interactions a major concern in engineering
because rank reversals should be rare. However, by
including coefficients bpq we allow for the possibility in
our model so that we can explore the influence of these
effects. If there are only two criteria, then ranking reversal
happens only if b12 \ -(b1 ? b2). Given our model, the
probability of this event is 0:5 1 ð2=pÞ tan1ð ﬃﬃﬃ2p =sÞ :
Therefore we see that the parameter s enables the modeler
to set the probability as desired, but some additional
guidance is useful. According to a study by Li et al. (2006),
two-factor interactions in physical experiments are typi-
cally about 20% of main effects. If s is 0.2, the probability
of a preference reversal due to an interaction is about 5%
per opportunity. In other words, if we choose values of s
typical of physical experiments, then individual criteria and
overall merit are consistent in roughly 95% of all instances.
With good specification of the design problem, inter-cri-
terion interactions may be smaller than interactions
between physical factors, but this is a subject for further
research. Those using the model can modify their
assumptions in this regard or test the influence of their
assumptions by changing the value of s in the model.
4.2 Profitability of Pugh Controlled Convergence
This section is intended to represent an implementation of
Pugh Controlled convergence including a model of prof-
itability. We adapted the model described in Sect. 3.2
which included three rounds of Pugh matrices to include
the profit model presented in Sect. 4.1. Also, for the
purpose of simulation, the final convergence from a
handful of options to a single alternative had to be forced
somehow. Although Pugh emphasized that this final
decision rests with the engineers and not with the matrix,
we simply chose the design with the highest difference
between the sum of 1 scores and sum of 2 scores in that
column of the matrix, a heuristic procedure sometimes
called ‘‘tallying’’ (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
In Fig. 6 are plotted the results of these PuCC process
simulations. The abscissa represents the average P of the
selected concept normalized by the maximum value in the
initial population of design concepts. The ordinate repre-
sents the model parameter rij which can be interpreted as
the uncertainty in the criterion scores.
A principal observation from Fig. 6 is that the possi-
bility of continuing ideation during evaluation, as was
strongly emphasized by Pugh, has a large influence on the
outcomes. Figure 5 suggests that even when rij is unity
meaning uncertainty is as large as the variations within the
population, the benefits of continued ideation are larger
than the decrements due to uncertainty so that one will
attain average P values exceeding the maximum value in
the initial population. The implication is that no degree of
finesse applied to the decision among the fixed set of initial
alternatives can compensate for failing to exploit the ben-
efits of additional creative design work.
A second major observation from Fig. 6 is that there is
very little influence of small degrees of uncertainty on the
PuCC process. Figure 6 suggests that even when rij is less
than 0.5 meaning uncertainty is half as large as the varia-
tions within the population, the influence on the outcomes
is very nearly zero for all four scenarios we simulated.
Our last major observation from Fig. 6 is that the ben-
efits of focused investigation are considerable, especially
when uncertainties are large. Figure 6 suggests that even
when rij is as large as unity and ideation is not used,
investigation can remove the majority of the losses due to
uncertainty. This is somewhat surprising since investiga-
tions in our model are conducted for only about 10% of the
criterion/concept pairs. Thus, our model tends to support
the notion that Pugh matrices are helpful in locating
leverage points for modeling, experimentation, and infor-
mation sharing among experts.
4.3 A model of the decision based design framework
This section describes an implementation of Hazelirigg’s
Decision Based Design framework (1998) as applied to the
model presented in Sect. 4.1. The scenario simulated is
similar to that in Sect. 4.2 except that there is only a single
round of evaluation. Also, because the mathematics of
decision making as conceptualized by Hazelrigg apply only
to individual decision makers, we assume there is just one
expert in this model. We formulated a single summary
criterion which is that expert’s estimate of expected
Fig. 6 The outcomes after three runs of the Pugh matrix
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profitability, PE. We assume this estimate is related to the
true profitability of the concepts but subject to uncertainty
so that PEj = Pj(1 ? ej) with ej Nð0; r2j Þ: We model the
decision maker as risk neutral so that he prefers the highest
expected value of profit. Under this assumption, the deci-
sion is made simply by picking the largest scalar from
among the 15 estimated PEj values. We modified the
simulation used in Sect. 4.2 to reflect these changes. We set
the strength of the datum at a moderate value (s = 1) and
we ran these simulations for a range of different degrees of
uncertainty in expert judgment r and plotted the P value of
the selected concept normalized by the maximum value of
P in the available set of 15 alternatives. The results are
depicted in Fig. 7 with selected data from Fig. 6 also
shown for comparison.
The results presented in Fig. 7 admit a simple inter-
pretation. When the designer’s uncertainty is zero, the
profitability is 100% of the potential within the initial set of
15 designs. In other words, if somehow the profitability of
the design concepts can be estimated accurately, then
choosing the highest estimated profit will obviously max-
imize the profit. However, the plot shows that as the
designer’s uncertainty rises, profit attained drops. With a r
of 1.0, only about 75% of the potential profit will be
realized on average. Note that given a r of 1.0, the
uncertainty in the evaluation of profitability is roughly as
large as the variance among the profitability of the options.
This is by no means an upper limit—the uncertainty
involved in estimating profitability at an early stage of the
design process might be substantially greater.
Figure 7 also depicts data from Fig. 6 on the perfor-
mance of PuCC under the worst scenario we considered—
no ideation or investigation allowed. Note that PuCC per-
forms about 5% worse than the DBD approach at zero
error. According to our model, the payoff for implementing
the DBD framework is that this 5% loss might be avoided.
If the resources needed and constraints imposed by DBD
detract from ideation or investigation, the net effect of
DBD will be negative according to our model.
The two decision procedures plotted in Fig. 7 offer very
similar performance as a function of the parameter r with
an advantage for the DBD approach as r rises above unity.
An advantage for PuCC not shown on Fig. 7 is the con-
sistency of results from trial to trial. For example, at
r = 1.5, PuCC has worse outcomes on average than DBD,
but the variance in the outcomes is somewhat less. This is
substantially due to the averaging of error that will tend to
occur when groups participate in judgments. Such an effect
strongly depends on our modeling assumption of inde-
pendence of the error across the population of participants.
Another point is worth mentioning regarding interpre-
tation of Fig. 7. As discussed in Sect. 2.5, the research of
Smith et al. (1984) show that the reliability of human
judgments is better by roughly a factor of two in discrim-
ination tasks as compared to magnitude estimation tasks.
Since PuCC is based on discrimination of each concept
with a datum and the DBD framework substantially
depends on magnitude estimation according to Fig. 3 (such
as estimation of costs), we infer that r should be substan-
tially lower for PuCC than for DBD. If this phenomenon
documented by of Smith et al. (1984) actually applies in
engineering design as well as in the tasks they studied,
PuCC might provide better results than DBD even in
highly uncertain environments.
A preliminary conclusion of this comparative analysis is
that internally consistent decision processes can still result
in very large losses when uncertainty is high. These losses
are due to lack of external correspondence of the decision
maker’s judgment. By contrast, PuCC may be subject to
some potential for internal inconsistencies, but it enables
better external correspondence in this model since it
involves many experts in the decision and focuses their
attention on things that are important to the decision out-
come. An alternative interpretation of the simulation
results is that the DBD framework was overly penalized in
this model by restriction to a single decision maker. The
DBD framework does not preclude the individual decision
maker from gathering and incorporating the views of sev-
eral experts, so perhaps the single expert should be given a
lower r value than any one of the multiple experts that are
individually contributing to the PuCC process.
4.4 A Model of the Borda count
This section is intended to represent an implementation of
Saari and Sieberg’s suggested approach (Saari and Sieberg
2004) as applied to the model presented here. We consider
the possibility of a Borda count over multiple experts using
one criterion and also a Borda count over multiple criteria
as judged by a single expert.
Fig. 7 The profit earned based on decisions using a single expert
using only estimates of expected profit
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We modified the simulation from Sect. 4.3 so that 11
experts were involved in the decision, but only a single
criterion, PE, was employed and the Borda count was used
to combine the information from the experts to choose a
single alternative. The results appeared virtually indistin-
guishable from those from one expert choosing as
described in Sect. 4.3. This confirms that the Borda count
generally retains the internal consistency of the DBD
framework, but is also similarly sensitive to uncertainty
despite involving multiple experts.
We also modified the simulation from Sect. 4.3 so that
18 criteria were used and the Borda count was used as if the
criteria were voting for the winner as Saari and Sieberg
(2004) described. The winner of the election was recorded
and the P value was computed for each trial. We repeated
this procedure in 1,000 probabilistically independent sim-
ulations. This process was repeated for four different
values of s.
The results are depicted graphically in Fig. 8 with the
degree of interaction among criteria values plotted on the
abscissa and normalized profitability on the ordinate. A
conclusion based on Fig. 8 is that, if the criteria are rea-
sonably separable (s = 0.1 or 0.2), then the Borda count
over multiple criteria performs quite similarly to the Borda
count over multiple experts based on profit alone. How-
ever, if criteria interact strongly (s = 0.3 or 0.4), then there
appears to be a substantial advantage to using just a single
summary criterion. We should warn that this assumes that
somehow the experts can judge the summary measure
(such as expected profitability) with only as much uncer-
tainty as they would judge the 18 separate criteria. We
would venture to say that profitability cannot be estimated
as precisely as engineering criteria such as axial stiffness or
ease of assembly.
Our preliminary conclusion in this sub-section is that the
impact of inter-criterion interactions on PuCC is small for
realistic scenarios and is outweighed by what might be lost
by diverting attention away from creative work. As noted
in Sects. 3, 4 a large meta-analysis of data (Li et al. 2006)
showed interactions are typically 20% of single factor
effects. This would correspond to s = 0.2. But this meta-
study data represents interactions among physical factors.
We suggest interactions among criteria will be even
smaller because: (1) the team of experts are free to define
criteria in such a way that they avoid large interactions, and
(2) market segmentation tends to limit the degree of dif-
ferences among concepts considered in PuCC which, a
Taylor’s series approximation suggests, will encourage a
more linear mapping between criteria and overall merit.
4.5 A model of rating and weighting
This section is intended to represent an implementation of
one of Takai and Ishii’s (2004) proposed variants of Pugh’s
method as applied to the model presented here.
We modified the simulation from Sect. 4.3 so that each
criterion score is estimated (as a real valued scalar) by a
single expert and that linear weighting factors bi are esti-
mated with the same degree of uncertainty as criterion
scores. The ratings and weightings are used to form a score
and the concept with the highest score is selected. Note
that, given this model, the scores from the rating weighting
matrix differ from P only because of uncertainty (rij) in
criterion and weight estimates and because of non-zero
criterion interactions bpq (we set s = 0.1). We repeated this
procedure in 1,000 probabilistically independent simula-
tions. The results of the simulation process are depicted
graphically in Fig. 9.
A preliminary conclusion based on Fig. 9 is that, if
uncertainties in criterion scores are the same in both
methods (PuCC and rating and weighting), then the out-
comes are very similar. But again, research of Smith et al.
(1984) show that the reliability of human judgments is
improved by about a factor of two in pairwise comparison
Fig. 8 The profit earned as a function of the interactions among
criteria
Fig. 9 The profit earned based on decisions using a single expert
using ratings and linear weightings
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as opposed to magnitude estimation. If that research applies
here, PuCC is preferred to rating and weighting even when
no new concepts are generated.
5 Conclusions
The conclusions drawn from this study must be viewed in
light of the degree of model validation conducted thus far.
First, as a minimum, we believe the model presented here
has enough common structure with concept design sce-
narios to enable ‘‘surrogative reasoning’’—it allows us to
reason directly about the representation in order to draw
conclusions about the phenomenon that it depicts (Swoyer
1991). In addition, the model is in reasonable agreement
with four case studies. It is important to recognize that
more validation is required before the model presented here
can serve as a predictive tool. However, the model has been
subject to more validation and has been evaluated with
substantially more empirical data than the papers criticiz-
ing Pugh’s method.
5.1 Conclusions about Pugh Controlled Convergence
The models presented here support the contention that
Pugh Controlled Convergence is an effective method to
apply during the concept design phase. There are risks of
internal inconsistencies and distortions as emphasized by
Hazelrigg, Saari and Sieberg, and Frannsen (as summarized
in Fig. 1), but the model suggests that these considerations
are outweighed by other issues. Engineering experience
with PuCC has generally been good and the model pre-
sented here supports a positive evaluation and enables
further probing into required assumptions and underlying
mechanisms.
A principal conclusion of this paper is that PuCC can
improve the creative process. The method encourages the
team to present, in an easily interpreted visual format,
patterns of information concerning the alternatives and
their merits relative to criteria. This helps focus the creative
work of the team on developing new concepts that can
dominate other alternatives under consideration. If this can
be done, then our model suggests that decision making is
greatly facilitated. Because of this, we conclude that ide-
ation and evaluation should proceed in parallel and that a
major objective of PuCC is to encourage this. Our model
suggests is that if just a couple new hybrid concepts emerge
from insights arising from Pugh evaluation matrices, then
these benefits trump the concerns about potential violations
of internal consistency. On the other hand, ideation is not
exclusive to PuCC. Perhaps more can be done within
design frameworks such as Decision Based Design to
interweave periods of concept generation among periods of
concept evaluation. This would require development and
testing of some practices within these frameworks that
would call attention to promising opportunities for hybrid
formation and reversal of negative attributes.
Another important conclusion is that uncertainty should
not be taken as an immutable facet of design decision
making. Engineering design, as it is normally practiced,
includes a sequential, iterative process by which uncertain-
ties are reduced through experimentation, investigation, and
information sharing among experts. Methods that facilitate
this learning process should be strongly encouraged. The
model presented here supports the idea that PuCC can help
teams target alternative/criterion pairs with high leverage in
the decisions they face. In our models, reducing uncertainty
in a targeted fashion improved the design outcomes. Similar
observations were made by Ward et al. (1995) in studying
design at Toyota and Nippondenso where multiple design
options are often carried forward, concept selection is
deferred, and decisions can be based on more data.
Our model supports the notion that the datum concept is
important, especially in the early rounds of PuCC. The
practical consequence is that datum selection should not be
haphazard. An analysis of the existing competition should
be undertaken to identify a concept that can serve as a
yardstick for all the others (perhaps a leader in the mar-
ketplace). Our model suggests that a strong datum is likely
to simplify decision making and improve the rate of con-
vergence. This conclusion fits well into a broad historical
perspective of engineering. Most every successful new
design results from evolution of existing successful
designs. We conclude that the central role of a strong
datum concept in Pugh’s method is well aligned with the
evolutionary nature of most engineering.
The models presented here also support the notion that
Pugh’s method encourages greater objectivity in engi-
neering decision-making. In general, people working
together on an engineering project should have a sub-
stantial agreement on goals (such as whether profit is the
dominant objective) and values (such as attitude toward
risk). If such agreement is in place, differences of opinion
on an engineering team can frequently be settled based on
facts. Because of this, engineering decisions may converge
as knowledge is shared and evidence is accumulated. In
other words, we agree with Scott and Antonsson (1999)
that there exists a well-defined aggregated order among
alternatives and that the availability of this order depends
on ‘‘time and resources’’. Pugh’s method is intended to
facilitate this sort of fact-based convergence. By focusing
the team on criteria at an appropriate level of detail, the
resulting decisions can be determined more by facts and
less by emotional attachments of team members to favorite
concepts. Movement in the direction of objectivity,
although never realized perfectly, is to be greatly valued.
56 Res Eng Design (2009) 20:41–58
123
5.2 Conclusions about design theory
The analysis of Pugh Controlled Convergence enables
insights into the role of economics and social choice theory
as tools for understanding engineering decision making.
These theories make assumptions that don’t always map
well into engineering. For example, Saari and Sieberg’s
analysis of election procedures assumes each person’s sta-
ted preference ordering deserves equal consideration. This
seems appropriate in a democratic election, but not so
appropriate in engineering. Imagine a scenario in which an
engineer believes, based on her expertise, that a particular
concept is weak and a voting process results in the team
selecting that concept. If the dissenting individual based her
judgment on facts not known to the others, it provides little
comfort that the voting process ensures that her opinion was
weighted just as much as every other expert’s opinion. We
suggest that it would be better to spend time discussing, in
concrete engineering terms, her reasons for holding her
opinion rather than investing that same time in a process
that prevents the distorting effects of Condorcet cycles. The
results in Sect. 4.4 suggest that investigating the reasons for
a difference of opinion and exploring new options in light of
what is revealed is more productive than using a carefully
crafted election procedure to decide the matter.
Franssen (2005) proposes that Arrow’s theorem applies
fully to multi-criteria decision-making because preferences
are ‘‘mental concepts neither logically or causally deter-
mined by’’ physical parameters. The implication is that
Arrow’s stipulated conditions such as Unrestricted Domain
and Minimal Liberty imply that preferences must be
unrestricted by any demand for objectivity. In personal and
political contexts, perhaps people should be unrestricted in
this sense, but in an engineering context, it seems inap-
propriate. If an engineer is faced with a solid body of
evidence showing the superiority of one alternative over
another, we argue they must either conform to the evidence
or else their view is irrelevant to rational engineering
decision making. Our model provides a means to explore
this contention. The model explicitly includes the concept
of objective merits possessed by design concepts (reli-
ability, manufacturability, performance). Such objective
merits have a bearing on the bottom line outcomes. During
the design process, engineers work to improve these
objective merits and also the better characterize them and
the way they map to summary measures (like profitability).
Good correspondence of expert judgments with facts is
essential to good engineering design. In our models,
external correspondence breaks down in the limit that rij
becomes very large. In this case, the expert’s estimates are
aligned poorly with one another and with facts. Our models
suggest that profit earned will drop rapidly as external
correspondence breaks down. We conclude it is best to
avoid a subjectivist position toward engineering decision-
making.
More generally, much of research in engineering design
today depicts decision making as a process that begins after
the set of alternatives is closed. In this light, trade-offs take
center stage. For example, See et al. (2004) state ‘‘There
are always trade-offs in decision making. We have to pay
more for better quality, carry around a heavier laptop if we
want a larger display, or wait longer in line for increased
airport security. More specifically, in engineering design,
we can be certain there is no one alternative that is better in
every dimension’’. On the other hand, on longer time
scales, engineering provides better quality for less money,
engineering leads to laptops that are both lighter and have
larger displays, and engineering might eventually enable
better airport security with shorter queuing times. We think
this longer term perspective weighs strongly against use of
engineering methods that place too much emphasis on
trade-offs, especially in the early stages of design. Such
methods may preclude opportunities to create advances
beyond the current state of the art. Such advances are
needed not only in breakthrough projects, but also play a
part in even the most routine design work wherein per-
formance, cost, and reliability are incrementally evolved to
levels previously thought to be impossible.
5.3 Suggestion for future research
This paper has presented a model-based evaluation of Pugh
Controlled Convergence. We suggest that additional work
is needed in empirical validation of the results and also
further exploration of the theoretical implications. Below
we expand on these possibilities in turn.
The conclusions of this paper should be put to the test by
means of experiments with human subjects. Two types of
experimental testing seem to be possible in this context: (1)
controlled experiments in the lab placing Pugh’s method up
against alternatives under essentially equivalent conditions
of time, resources, and skill levels of the teams; and (2) full
scale field tests in which real projects are conducted, some
using Pugh’s method and some using alternatives. The
evidence from laboratory conditions can attain more pre-
cise estimates of the effects of methodological differences,
but the second approach is also necessary to ensure the
benefits translate to the less controlled conditions and
longer time scales od authentic engineering practice.
There has been much discussion of rationality in engi-
neering design and most of the emphasis in this discussion
has been on internal consistency. Sen (1993) has argued
that internal consistency demands ‘‘cannot be assessed
without seeing them in the context of some external cor-
respondence, that is, some demand originating outside the
choice function itself’’. We suggest this represents a great
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opportunity for research concerning external correspon-
dence and its role in engineering decision-making. It seems
to us that a theory of engineering design, recognizing the
important role of decision making, must have something to
say about not only how data are processed by an individual,
but also how data are gathered via interaction with the real
world. Such a theory might reveal exciting links between
research in cognitive psychology and research in engi-
neering design.
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